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REVIEW  
 
Jean Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil, or The Lucidity Pact [2004], translated by 
Chris Turner (London; New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), ISBN: 978-1-7809-3568-3 
 
In this essay I review one of Baudrillard’s last, and arguably best, books—The Intelligence of 
Evil, or The Lucidity Pact—which last year (2013) was re-published by Bloomsbury as part of 
their Revelations series. I begin by situating this late work within Baudrillard’s voluminous 
and many-sided corpus. I focus on the text’s two major concepts: Integral Reality and Evil. 
 
Star to Black Hole (Baudrillard’s trajectory) 
 The 1980s was Baudrillard’s decade. He was everywhere—a jet-setter—criss-crossing the 
academic and cultural landscape. During the late 1960s through the early 1970s, Baudrillard 
settled his scores with Marcel Mauss and Marx in texts like Symbolic Exchange and Death and 
The Mirror of Production. The late 1970s, however, marked a turn. Baudrillard’s writing in-
creasingly distanced itself from the signposts of academic discourse. Thus began the cycle 
Baudrillard would later call his “theory-fictions.” In 1976, he submitted his article “Forget 
Foucault” to the journal Critique (for which Foucault was at that time serving as an editor). 
The article was rejected, but was later published by Semiotext(e). “Forget Foucault” an-
nounced the death of critique. What is needed is not a critique of reality, but a critique of 
the faith in reality. To believe in reality, including most especially the reality of power, as 
critique does, is to succumb to what Baudrillard calls the “vital illusion” integral to the vi-
tality of power. 
In 1991 Baudrillard published three essays in Liberation in which he claimed that the 
Gulf War “was not taking place.” The response by many intellectuals and the general public 
was outrage and indignation. But what Baudrillard meant was that the war had no place in 
the order of the Real for the West. The war only existed as a set of guarded reports and a 
stream of two-dimensional, grainy, green coloured, night-vision images made by “smart 
bombs” dropped by invisible “stealth” machines. The Gulf War was primarily a television 
show for the West. The war, like Seinfeld, with which it competed for viewers, was a TV 
show in which nothing ever really happened. Such is the essence of television shows: they 
take up time but not place. 
By the end of the 1990s, Baudrillard’s star was setting. Some saw his nadir as twenty 
years overdue. Baudrillard, once the oracle of simulation, now seemed a simulation of phi-
losophy dreamed up in the heady days of High Theory. With his decline, Baudrillard ap-
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peared to retrace the course charted by Marshall McLuhan: from media theorist, to media 
star, to collapse. But Baudrillard relished the terminal state. Black holes figure prominently 
in Baudrillard’s later writing. 
 
Integral Reality 
At the start of the new millennium, Baudrillard was something of a spectral outsider. The 
once reigning superstar of cultural theory was increasingly hard-pressed to find a sympa-
thetic ear. With 9/11, theory moved back to the Real, the world, the body, to politics, to 
economy, to sex, to what Baudrillard had once called “the Real’s big numbers.”1 Unde-
terred, Baudrillard pressed on. He extended and even radicalized his simulation hypothe-
sis. 
Baudrillard proposed a new theory: Integral Reality. This theory achieves its most 
explicit and crystalline formulation in The Intelligence of Evil, or The Lucidity Pact. It was pub-
lished in 2004 at a moment when the West was deep in the grip of a reality scare following 
the horror of September 11. Yet simulation was soon at work again in the form of The War 
on Terror. The enemy—terrorism—was billed as a kind of “phantom-menace” (to borrow 
from Star Wars). Terror is said to exist as an ever present threat—a virtual threat—that 
threatens to become reality at any moment. How to contain terror? This was the question 
faced by US (and world) policy makers. The answer was to realize terror virtually (for the 
West) by making terror both real and spectral. The doctrine of pre-emption generated a log-
ically hysterical sequence: the war on terror, terrifying terror by war, making actual war to 
keep terror virtual. The War on Terror initiated the logic of involution, a fatal inward turn-
ing spiral, to use one of Baudrillard’s favourite figures.2 In this state of inward collapse, get-
ting the proper critical distance, Baudrillard says, is impossible. The problem now is that 
things are too close. There is less and less distance between simulation and the real world. 
How can this problematic be addressed? 
First, simulation cannot be addressed by looking to linguistics either as model or 
method for the problem of signification is not the same as that of simulation. The signifier—
even a “floating signifier”—is tethered to the problem of reference, even as this floating 
form (fetish of poststructuralists) undermines the certainty of the referential operation. The 
philosophical ascent of the signifier, which Baudrillard’s early work helped establish, pre-
supposes a distance—an abyss even—between word and world. This distance enables the 
project of critique to continue even as it faces new (primarily linguistic) challenges. But 
simulation, argues Baudrillard, does not institute a relation to reality homologous to that of 
the relation between sign and referent. Indeed there is no “relation” and no “distance” be-
tween simulation and reality. If one wants an analogy with language, a more fitting one 
would be that of computer code. 
                                                 
1 Jean Baudrillard, Forget Foucault, translated by Phil Beitchman, Nicole Dufresne, Lee Hildreth, Mark 
Polizzotti (Cambridge: MIT Press/Semiotext(e), 2007).  
2 See, for example, Jean Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies, translated by Phil Beitchman, W.G.J. Nielsuchowski 
(Cambridge: MIT Press/Semiotext(e), 2008). 
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Computer code is a language, but it does not refer to anything outside itself. A com-
puter code and the program it codes are one and the same: there is no “distance” between 
the two. Simulation and the world are similarly connected: the former produces, and is 
immanent to, the latter. It is this embedding of simulation in the very world it produces that 
Baudrillard calls Integral Reality. 
Integral Reality is Baudrillard’s name for the realization of the world in its immedia-
cy—without distance—through simulated means. Simulation produces and embeds itself 
into “reality” like a sphere of ever increasing density where nothing virtual can escape be-
ing realized. Baudrillard writes up his theory in one master formula: “Integral Reality: the 
irreversible movement towards the totalization of the world” (16). 
Integral Reality’s inexorable march towards realization, however, is troubled by its 
inverted double to which Baudrillard gives the name The Dual Form. Baudrillard writes: 
“The Dual Form: the reversibility internal to the irreversible movement of the real” (16). 
The West is trapped, argues Baudrillard, in this fatal spiral, this “dual drive,” this “Great 
Game” (17). The Dual Form is what threatens to reverse the calculus of Integral Reality by 
exposing reality to its own virtuality. Baudrillard writes:  
 
[T]he real is part of our imaginary. And realizing everything is akin to a universal fulfill-
ment of desire. But today we are living through a turnabout that makes this universal ful-
filment appear like a negative destiny—a catastrophic truth test (16). 
 
The realization of the Virtual is the protective measure taken against the threat posed by 
The Dual Form, namely, that reality will be seen to be virtual. Such is the “fatal form” of the 
dialectic of reality and appearance in the era of Integral Reality. 
 
Evil 
What then of evil? Baudrillard’s concept of evil does not resemble what is found in the pag-
es of theology and moral philosophy. Nor does Baudrillard’s concept of evil bear any rela-
tion to that of “misfortune”—the status to which he thinks evil has been reduced under late 
capital. Misfortune is a convenient substitute name for evil in (late) capitalist society for 
misfortune is “clear,” calculable, and “verifiable” (109). Evil by contrast is a “confused and 
impenetrable idea” (109). The contemporary imperative of transparency, the demand that 
nothing be invisible, is an edict against anything that falls beyond the regime of panoptical 
power. To be obscure, undocumented, off-the-grid, out of touch, out of reach, is bad form, 
an impoliteness, a sign of social deviance, a breach of today’s social contract. Misfortune “is 
the easiest solution to the impossibility of thinking evil” (109). Evil for Baudrillard is what 
can neither be conceptualized nor reduced to, nor exchanged for, anything: it is the master 
signifier of Baudrillard’s category of “impossible exchange” (116). 
For Baudrillard, evil is a name for radical alterity. Evil is wholly other. It cannot ac-
commodate the logic of reduction, exchange, transformation, or sublimation. Evil has there-
fore, for Baudrillard, no content as such: it can only be negatively defined as non-
computability, non-accountability, radical alterity. The “axis of evil”—a group of states on 
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the US watch list—is, in this view, a metaphysical chimera that results from the reduction of 
evil to the economic and strategic imperatives of the military-industrial complex. It is a way 
of “containing” evil by intelligence operations. But to have “intelligence of evil” is nonsense 
for Baudrillard. One cannot reduce evil to anything, which includes reducing it to an “ob-
ject” over which a subject has intelligence, and therefore control. Baudrillard writes, “with 
evil it is not a question of an object to be understood; we are dealing with a form that un-
derstands us” (124). Evil exposes the moral frailty of the human condition. Insofar as this 
object of evil exposes the subject of humanity, then evil has the power to reverse the subject-
object relation.  
The Intelligence of Evil is perhaps Baudrillard’s most rigorous and certainly one of his 
more complex works. But throughout the book there is an air of monastic muttering as if 
Baudrillard is playing the metaphysician in the fantasy land of late capital. In a remote cor-
ner, cut off from the centre of the academic industry, and no longer the lone-star outsider he 
was in the 1980s, Baudrillard stakes out a position both pessimistic and challenging: behind 
the triumphal facade of calculative reason and Integral Reality, there is nothing except evil, 
which is nothing more “than the world as it is and as it has been” (111).  
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